Compliance Radar

Who was sanctioned, and for what?

Fines, court rulings and incidents from Europe, North America, Latin America, Asia-Pacific, Middle East and Africa: 2,207 cases from 44 jurisdictions, each with an official source and checked against that source before publication. Filter by country, area of law and sector. Click a chart to drill down one level.

12cases from 7 jurisdictions
€159.1mTotal of monetary amounts
€75.3mLargest single case: a Swedish major bank
€1.88mMedian per case with an amount

Click a bar to drill down one level.

When?

per year, by date of decision
Trend
PeriodCasesTotal
20222€62.3m
20231€75.3m
20242€3.04m
20256€17.9m
20261€501,614

12 cases

22 Sep 2026 OTC Link LLCOTC Link: 575,000 USD – security policies never completed despite examination findings USACritical infrastructure €501,614

From 2016 to 2025, the operator of the OTC Link ATS trading system lacked complete policies on systems security, access control and vulnerability management as required under Regulation SCI. Although the examiners of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had criticised the gaps in several examinations, drafts remained unfinished; the SEC issued a censure and imposed 575,000 USD.

What organisations can take from it

Track supervisory examination findings with a deadline and a responsible person – points that remain open repeatedly become expensive.

Authority / court
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
Area of law
Information security and cyber · Critical infrastructure
Legal basis
Regulation SCI, Rule 1001(a)(1)–(3)
Action
Fine
Status of proceedings
final
Sector
Financial services and insurance
Repeat case
yes

Original amount 575,000 USD, converted at the ECB reference rate of 22 Sep 2026.

Checked against the official source on 25 Sep 2026 · Direct link

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11 Dec 2025 Singapore Telecommunications Limited (Singtel)IMDA: SGD 1m against Singtel after hours-long fixed-line voice outage SingaporeCritical infrastructure €660,197

On 8 October 2024 Singtel's fixed-line voice service failed for more than four hours for around 500,000 residential and corporate users; customer service lines of government agencies, healthcare organisations and banks as well as emergency call services were also affected. The cause was that the virtualised firewalls of the voice system and of a monitoring system shared the same hardware, so that an overload of the insufficiently filtered monitoring system also disrupted the voice system and the automatic failover did not work cleanly; according to the investigation, there was no cyber-attack. The Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA, Singapore's telecoms and media regulator) imposed a penalty of SGD 1 million under the Telecommunications Act because the incident had been within Singtel's control to prevent.

What organisations can take from it

Critical services need separated components and reliably tested failover mechanisms – shared hardware can turn a fault in an ancillary system into an outage of the core service.

Authority / court
Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA)
Area of law
Information security and cyber · Critical infrastructure
Legal basis
Telecommunications Act
Action
Fine
Status of proceedings
unknown
Sector
Telecoms, IT and software
Employees
10,000 or more
Published
11 Dec 2025

Original amount 1,000,000 SGD, converted at the ECB reference rate of 11 Dec 2025.

Checked against the official source on 4 Oct 2026 · Direct link

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1 Dec 2025 One New Zealand Group Limited (One NZ)One NZ: 1.1 million NZD for breaches of the 111 emergency calling code New ZealandCritical infrastructure €543,022

Following proceedings brought by the Commerce Commission (New Zealand's competition and consumer regulator), the High Court ordered One New Zealand Group Limited to pay a pecuniary penalty of 1,100,000 NZD; in addition, the company is paying 100,000 NZD towards the authority's costs, which is not included in the amount. One NZ admitted ten breaches of the 111 Contact Code between 2021 and 2023 concerning information duties, record-keeping and regular contact with customers. The Code is intended to ensure that vulnerable customers whose landline does not work in a power cut receive another way of calling 111 at no cost.

What organisations can take from it

Providers moving customers from copper to new landline technology must actively follow up and fully document vulnerable customers' ability to make emergency calls during power cuts.

Relevance to training and awareness

Duties to vulnerable customers regarding emergency calls during power cuts: inform, follow up, document

Authority / court
High Court of New Zealand (Verfahren der Commerce Commission)
Area of law
Information security and cyber · Critical infrastructure
Legal basis
Telecommunications Act 2001 (Neuseeland), s 156B; 111 Contact Code
Action
Fine
Status of proceedings
unknown
Sector
Telecoms, IT and software
Mitigating circumstances
According to the Commerce Commission, One NZ remedied the breaches as soon as it recognised their scale and cooperated fully with the investigation; the breaches were admitted.
Published
1 Dec 2025

Original amount 1,100,000 NZD, converted at the ECB reference rate of 1 Dec 2025.

Checked against the official source on 3 Oct 2026 · Direct link

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17 Oct 2025 Odido Netherlands B.V.Netherlands: 1.52 million EUR against Odido – interception system without security plan and staff screening NetherlandsCritical infrastructure €1.52m

In inspections in 2021/22, the RDI (Rijksinspectie Digitale Infrastructuur, the Dutch Authority for Digital Infrastructure) found that the mobile operator had no mandatory security plan for its system for lawful interception of telecommunications, that employees with access had not been adequately screened (missing job descriptions, confidentiality declarations, certificates of conduct), that unauthorised persons had access to interception data and that suppliers could access the system digitally. The RDI imposed 1,518,750 EUR; Odido has since renewed the system.

What organisations can take from it

Treat the security plan, staff screening and strictly limited supplier access for highly sensitive systems as the core of the obligation, not a formality.

Relevance to training and awareness

Access rights, staff screening and supplier access for sensitive systems

Authority / court
Rijksinspectie Digitale Infrastructuur (RDI)
Area of law
Information security and cyber · Critical infrastructure
Legal basis
Telecommunicatiewet Art. 15.4; Besluit beveiliging gegevens telecommunicatie (Bbgt) Art. 2, 3, 4
Action
Fine
Status of proceedings
unknown
Sector
Telecoms, IT and software
Mitigating circumstances
System renewed, risk of unauthorised access eliminated.
Published
17 Oct 2025

Checked against the official source on 28 Sep 2026 · Direct link

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3 Jul 2025 Telenor Norge ASTelenor Norge: 50 million NOK after four disruptions to emergency numbers in autumn 2024 NorwayCritical infrastructure €4.21m

The Nasjonal kommunikasjonsmyndighet (Nkom, Norwegian Communications Authority) imposed an administrative penalty (overtredelsesgebyr) of 50,000,000 NOK on Telenor Norge because, on four occasions in autumn 2024 (29 August, 16 September, 17/18 October, 13 November), emergency calls over its network failed entirely or intermittently or were misrouted. The inspection found 22 breaches of ekomloven (Electronic Communications Act), sikkerhetsloven (National Security Act) and several regulations, including inadequate risk assessments, planned work not carried out securely, insufficient redundancy, inadequate auditing of a subcontractor and late notification of the authority. In its final decision Nkom maintained the amount announced in February 2025; the deadline for an administrative appeal ran until 8 September 2025.

What organisations can take from it

Operators that carry emergency call services must safeguard planned network changes with a risk analysis and working redundancy, audit their suppliers and report disruptions on time.

Relevance to training and awareness

Planned work on critical networks: risk analysis, a working fallback and notifying the regulator within 30 minutes

Authority / court
Nasjonal kommunikasjonsmyndighet (Nkom)
Area of law
Information security and cyber · Critical infrastructure
Legal basis
ekomloven (lov 4. juli 2003 nr. 83), sikkerhetsloven (lov 1. juni 2018 nr. 24), ekomforskriften, nummerforskriften, klassifiseringsforskriften, virksomhetssikkerhetsforskriften
Action
Fine
Status of proceedings
unknown
Sector
Telecoms, IT and software
Employees
1,000 to 9,999
Published
3 Jul 2025

Original amount 50,000,000 NOK, converted at the ECB reference rate of 3 Jul 2025.

Checked against the official source on 28 Sep 2026 · Direct link

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20 Mar 2025 The London Metal Exchange (LME)London Metal Exchange: 9.2 million GBP – controls and escalation failed in nickel turmoil United KingdomCritical infrastructure €11m

When the nickel price rose to over 100,000 USD within just over an hour on 8 March 2022, only junior staff were on duty during Asian trading hours, and they had not been trained to recognise a disorderly market; they did not escalate and even switched off price bands. The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) imposed a fine on the recognised investment exchange for the first time: 9.2 million GBP after a 30% discount.

What organisations can take from it

Critical infrastructure needs trained staff around the clock and clear escalation paths – including at night and at off-peak times.

Relevance to training and awareness

Escalation of unusual market conditions; training of shift staff

Missing or inadequate training played a role in the decision.

Authority / court
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)
Area of law
Information security and cyber · Critical infrastructure
Legal basis
FCA REC 2.5.1 (Recognition Requirements); Art. 18 RTS 7 (MiFID II)
Action
Fine
Status of proceedings
final
Sector
Financial services and insurance
Mitigating circumstances
Early settlement (30% discount); improvements since March 2022.

Original amount 9,200,000 GBP, converted at the ECB reference rate of 20 Mar 2025.

Checked against the official source on 25 Sep 2026 · Direct link

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7 Jan 2025 City of Boardman (Oregon)City of Boardman: 8,770 USD – water system's risk assessment was an empty template USACritical infrastructure €8,438

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA, Region 10) imposed a civil penalty of 8,770 USD by consent agreement and final order on the City of Boardman (Oregon), whose drinking water system serves around 4,490 people. According to the EPA, the city had not prepared the risk and resilience assessment and emergency response plan required by the Safe Drinking Water Act on time and had not complied with a 2022 EPA order: at an inspection in April 2024 the assessment was an empty template, and the emergency response plan dated from 2005 and contained no cybersecurity section. The city admitted jurisdiction without admitting or denying the factual allegations and waived its right to appeal. The authority allegedly made the findings set out here; this account is not based on a final judgment.

What organisations can take from it

Mandatory assessments of physical and cyber security must be substantively prepared and kept up to date – a template that has merely been certified does not meet the obligation.

Relevance to training and awareness

Actually prepare the risk and resilience assessment, including cybersecurity, and keep the emergency response plan current

Authority / court
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Region 10
Area of law
Information security and cyber · Critical infrastructure
Legal basis
Safe Drinking Water Act Section 1433(a) und (b) (42 U.S.C. § 300i-2) sowie Section 1414(g)(3)(A); Strafe nach Section 1414(g)(3)(B) (42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(g)(3)(B))
Action
Fine
Status of proceedings
final
Sector
Energy and utilities
Repeat case
yes
Published
7 Jan 2025

Original amount 8,770 USD, converted at the ECB reference rate of 7 Jan 2025.

Checked against the official source on 3 Oct 2026 · Direct link

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1 Oct 2024 a US swap trading platformSwap trading platform: 875,000 USD because emergency and security tests were not brought before the board USACritical infrastructureanonymised €789,284

A US swap trading platform did not fully inform its board of the results of emergency, technology risk and penetration tests, did not regularly test its business continuity and disaster recovery capabilities and had no adequate risk management. It also failed to produce documents requested during an examination on time despite extensions of deadlines; the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) imposed 875,000 USD.

What organisations can take from it

Contingency plans only count if they are tested regularly and the results are noted by the entire governing body.

Authority / court
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
Area of law
Information security and cyber · Critical infrastructure
Legal basis
Commodity Exchange Act; CFTC-Regeln zu System Safeguards für Swap Execution Facilities
Action
Fine
Status of proceedings
final
Sector
Financial services and insurance

Original amount 875,000 USD, converted at the ECB reference rate of 1 Oct 2024.

Checked against the official source on 28 Sep 2026 · Version 3 · Company name anonymised since 1 Oct 2026 · Direct link

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21 May 2024 a Dutch telecommunications providerNetherlands: 2.25 million EUR against a telecommunications provider over inadequately secured interception system NetherlandsCritical infrastructureanonymised €2.25m

According to the Dutch Authority for Digital Infrastructure (RDI), a Dutch telecommunications provider did not take the necessary measures from October 2021 to December 2022 to protect data from lawful interception of telecommunications against unauthorised persons: the security plan was inadequate, staff with access had not been sufficiently screened (missing job descriptions, confidentiality declarations, certificates of conduct), and logical and physical access controls were deficient. No actual unauthorised access was found; the fine amounts to 2.25 million EUR.

What organisations can take from it

Treat interfaces for access by authorities as high-risk systems; document access controls and staff screening completely.

Relevance to training and awareness

Access control and staff screening for interception interfaces

Authority / court
Rijksinspectie Digitale Infrastructuur (RDI)
Area of law
Information security and cyber · Critical infrastructure
Legal basis
Telecommunicatiewet Art. 15.4; Besluit beveiliging gegevens telecommunicatie (Bbgt) Art. 2, 3, 4, 8
Action
Fine
Status of proceedings
unknown
Sector
Telecoms, IT and software
Mitigating circumstances
Deficiencies remedied after they were identified; no actual unauthorised access found.
Published
22 Oct 2024
Sources

Checked against the official source on 28 Sep 2026 · Version 4 · Company name anonymised since 21 May 2026 · Direct link

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14 Mar 2023 a Swedish major bankMajor bank: 850 million SEK – unapproved IT change led to wrong balances and blocked payments SwedenCritical infrastructureanonymised €75.3m

Finansinspektionen (Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority) issued a Swedish major bank with a remark (anmärkning) and an administrative fine of 850,000,000 SEK because on 28 April 2022 the bank made a change to a business-critical IT system – to implement new EU sanctions – without following its internal change management process: without approval by the Change Advisory Board, without a risk assessment and without a rollback plan. The resulting error stopped around 1.7 million transactions to about 1.1 million accounts, showed incorrect balances for almost 960,000 customers and prevented around 160,000 customers from making payments; because none of the bank's controls had detected that the process was bypassed, the supervisor found the internal control of this systemically important bank to be inadequate. It treated an earlier sanction from 2020 (oversight of anti-money laundering measures in subsidiary banks) as aggravating and, in the bank's favour, the fact that the breach was neither long-lasting nor systematic.

What organisations can take from it

Even urgent changes to critical IT systems prompted by regulation must go through the regular change process, and controls must detect when individuals bypass it.

Relevance to training and awareness

Change management: no change to critical IT systems without approval, risk assessment and a rollback plan

Authority / court
Finansinspektionen (FI)
Area of law
Information security and cyber · Critical infrastructure
Legal basis
6 kap. 2 § lagen (2004:297) om bank- och finansieringsrörelse (LBF) i. V. m. 2 kap. 1 § första stycket 5 FFFS 2014:1; Anmärkning nach 15 kap. 1 § LBF, Sanktionsavgift nach 15 kap. 7 § LBF
Action
Fine
Status of proceedings
unknown
Sector
Financial services and insurance
Employees
10,000 or more
Repeat case
yes
Mitigating circumstances
Not a long-lasting or systematic breach; the bank has taken, and announced further, measures to strengthen internal control.
Published
15 Mar 2023

Original amount 850,000,000 SEK, converted at the ECB reference rate of 14 Mar 2023.

Checked against the official source on 28 Sep 2026 · Company name anonymised since 14 Mar 2025 · Direct link

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20 Dec 2022 a British bankBritish bank: 48.65 million GBP – IT migration disrupted banking services for millions of customers United KingdomCritical infrastructureanonymised €55.6m

Following the migration to a new IT platform in April 2018, customers were able to carry out banking transactions in branches, by telephone and online only to a limited extent for months; all branches and a large proportion of the 5.2 million customers were affected. The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) accused the bank of deficient planning, governance and management of outsourcing risk and imposed a total of 48.65 million GBP (FCA 29.75 million, PRA 18.9 million).

What organisations can take from it

Major IT migrations at providers of critical services need robust governance, testing and contingency plans – including for the critical service provider.

Authority / court
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) und Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA)
Area of law
Information security and cyber · Critical infrastructure
Legal basis
FCA- und PRA-Anforderungen an operationelles Risikomanagement, Governance und Auslagerung
Action
Fine
Status of proceedings
final
Sector
Financial services and insurance
Mitigating circumstances
30% discount for settlement; 32.7 million GBP in compensation already paid to customers.

Original amount 48,650,000 GBP, converted at the ECB reference rate of 20 Dec 2022.

Sources

Checked against the official source on 28 Sep 2026 · Version 4 · Company name anonymised since 20 Dec 2024 · Direct link

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29 Sep 2022 a US futures exchangeUS futures exchange: 6.5 million USD – without adequate security testing USACritical infrastructureanonymised €6.7m

From 2017 to 2021, the New York futures exchange failed to comply with key system safeguards obligations: no controls testing, inadequate internal and external penetration testing, deficient technology risk assessments without involvement of the board and late notification of a security-relevant system change. In addition, there were reporting violations and a false statement to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC); owing to cooperation, the penalty was reduced to 6.5 million USD.

What organisations can take from it

Exchanges and other market infrastructures must not only carry out security tests but also demonstrably bring their results before the governing body.

Authority / court
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
Area of law
Information security and cyber · Critical infrastructure
Legal basis
Commodity Exchange Act; CFTC-Regeln zu System Safeguards für Designated Contract Markets
Action
Fine
Status of proceedings
final
Sector
Financial services and insurance
Mitigating circumstances
Substantial cooperation and remediation; penalty reduced accordingly.

Original amount 6,500,000 USD, converted at the ECB reference rate of 29 Sep 2022.

Checked against the official source on 28 Sep 2026 · Version 4 · Company name anonymised since 29 Sep 2024 · Direct link

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