Compliance Radar
Who was sanctioned, and for what?
Fines, court rulings and incidents from Europe, North America, Latin America, Asia-Pacific, Middle East and Africa: 2,207 cases from 44 jurisdictions, each with an official source and checked against that source before publication. Filter by country, area of law and sector. Click a chart to drill down one level.
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Where?
by authority- Wettbewerbskommission (WEKO) €55.6m 100 % · 10 cases
What for?
by topicWho?
by sectorAll sectors
- Retail and e-commerce €29.9m 54 % · 1 case
- Telecoms, IT and software €19.4m 35 % · 1 case
- Construction and real estate €5.37m 10 % · 3 cases
- Chemicals and pharmaceuticals €645,231 1 % · 1 case
- Other €122,929 0 % · 1 case
- Transport, logistics and shipping €98,722 0 % · 2 cases
- Media and online platforms – 0 % · 1 case
When?
per year, by date of decision| Period | Cases | Total |
|---|---|---|
| 2023 | 2 | €19.4m |
| 2024 | 4 | €5.46m |
| 2025 | 4 | €30.7m |
| 2026 | 0 | – |
10 cases
15 Dec 2025 Aktiengesellschaft Hallenstadion Zürich (AGH); Ticketcorner AGWEKO fines Hallenstadion Zurich and Ticketcorner over ticketing clause €122,929
At the end of 2008 Aktiengesellschaft Hallenstadion Zürich and Ticketcorner AG agreed that the arena would only be let to organisers selling at least 50% of tickets through Ticketcorner, which hindered other ticketing providers. After the Federal Supreme Court found a competition-law infringement in 2020 and remitted the case (2C_113/2017), the Wettbewerbskommission (WEKO, Swiss Competition Commission) classed both companies' conduct in 2009 to 2011 as abuse of a dominant position and, by decision of 15 December 2025, fined the Hallenstadion around CHF 50,000 and Ticketcorner around CHF 65,000. The arena operator had concluded an amicable settlement; the decision can be appealed to the Federal Administrative Court.
Exclusivity clauses between strong market players remain a competition risk, even if the proceedings only end years later.
Exclusivity clauses and tying by dominant undertakings
- Authority / court
- Wettbewerbskommission (WEKO)
- Area of law
- Competition law · Abuse of market power
- Legal basis
- Kartellgesetz (KG): Missbrauch einer marktbeherrschenden Stellung; Rückweisung BGer 2C_113/2017 vom 12.02.2020
- Action
- Fine
- Status of proceedings
- unknown
- Sector
- Other
- Mitigating circumstances
- The arena operator concluded an amicable settlement with WEKO.
- Published
- 22 Jan 2026
Original amount 115,000 CHF, converted at the ECB reference rate of 15 Dec 2025.
- WEKO-Medienmitteilung vom 22.01.2026: WEKO büsst Hallenstadion und Ticketcorner Press release of an authority
- Newsroom-Schnittstelle der Bundesverwaltung: Volltext der WEKO-Medienmitteilung vom 22.01.2026 (weko_13429) Press release of an authority
Checked against the official source on 2 Oct 2026 · Direct link
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25 Aug 2025 PAUPE HOLDING SA, Bitusag S.A., Bitusag Neuchâtel SA, Wyss Fils SA, Prodo SA, Duckert SAWEKO fines road maintenance firms in Jura/Neuchâtel over bid rigging Fine
Regional suppliers of surface treatments and chip sealing in road maintenance colluded on bids and allocated territories. Switzerland's Competition Commission (Wettbewerbskommission, WEKO) imposed sanctions on Bitusag/Paupe (jointly and severally, CHF 640,000–990,000, exact amount redacted), Wyss Fils (CHF 44,000–74,000), Prodo (CHF 760) and Duckert (CHF 0) and approved amicable settlements; the investigation against Colas Suisse was discontinued.
Small regional road builders are also sanctioned – cover bids and territorial protection must disappear from corporate culture.
Cover bids and territorial agreements in regional road construction
- Authority / court
- Wettbewerbskommission (WEKO)
- Area of law
- Competition law · Cartels and collusion
- Legal basis
- Art. 5 Abs. 3 i.V.m. Abs. 1 KG, Art. 49a Abs. 1 KG
- Action
- Fine
- Status of proceedings
- unknown
- Sector
- Construction and real estate
- Mitigating circumstances
- Amicable settlements; leniency programme (Duckert free of sanctions)
- Enduits superficiels et gravillonnage : Décision du 25 août 2025 Decision of an authority
Checked against the official source on 25 Sep 2026 · Direct link
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8 Jul 2025 Markant Handels- und Industriewaren-Vermittlungs AG und 16 Händlerinnen (in der Quelle nicht namentlich genannt)WEKO fines 16 retailers in the Markant buying cooperation around CHF 28 million €29.9m
The Wettbewerbskommission (WEKO, Swiss Competition Commission) found discounts negotiated jointly through the Markant cooperation to be lawful, but not opaque rebates: suppliers had to buy an ever more expensive service package from Markant, part of whose fees Markant passed on undisclosed to 16 retailers, and suppliers who refused faced collective countermeasures up to delisting. WEKO classed this as an unlawful purchasing-side price agreement and fined the 16 retailers a total of around CHF 28 million. The decision can be appealed to the Federal Administrative Court.
Buying cooperations may pool negotiating power, but payments to members must be disclosed to suppliers and must not be enforced through collective pressure.
Buying cooperations in retail: limits of joint negotiating power
- Authority / court
- Wettbewerbskommission (WEKO)
- Area of law
- Competition law · Cartels and collusion
- Legal basis
- Kartellgesetz (KG): unzulässige einkaufsseitige Preisabrede
- Action
- Fine
- Status of proceedings
- unknown
- Sector
- Retail and e-commerce
- Published
- 8 Jul 2025
Original amount 28,000,000 CHF, converted at the ECB reference rate of 8 Jul 2025.
- WEKO-Medienmitteilung vom 08.07.2025: WEKO schafft Praxis zu Einkaufskooperationen Press release of an authority
- Newsroom-Schnittstelle der Bundesverwaltung: Volltext der WEKO-Medienmitteilung vom 08.07.2025 (weko_5848) Press release of an authority
Checked against the official source on 2 Oct 2026 · Direct link
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10 Apr 2025 Boehringer Ingelheim, Alkaloids of Australia, C2 PHARMA u. a. (7 Unternehmen)WEKO sanctions active-ingredient cartel over butylscopolamine bromide at around CHF 600,000 €645,231
Between 2005 and 2019 Boehringer Ingelheim, Alkaloids of Australia, Alkaloids Corporation, Alchem, C2 PHARMA, Linnea and Transo-Pharm set minimum selling prices for the active ingredient butylscopolamine bromide (SNBB), allocated quotas and exchanged sensitive business information. The Wettbewerbskommission (WEKO, Swiss Competition Commission) closed the case with amicable settlements; sanctions total around CHF 600,000, with C2 PHARMA as the self-reporting party exempted in full and Transo-Pharm and Linnea in part. It is the first cartel concerning a pharmaceutical active ingredient that WEKO has sanctioned.
Even small niche markets for intermediate products are watched by competition authorities, and the first to report can escape the sanction entirely.
Cartel risks for intermediate products and active ingredients; leniency programme
- Authority / court
- Wettbewerbskommission (WEKO)
- Area of law
- Competition law · Cartels and collusion
- Legal basis
- Kartellgesetz (KG): Preis- und Mengenabrede, einvernehmliche Regelungen, Bonusregelung
- Action
- Fine
- Status of proceedings
- unknown
- Sector
- Chemicals and pharmaceuticals
- Mitigating circumstances
- Amicable settlements; full immunity for C2 PHARMA (leniency programme), partial reduction for Transo-Pharm and Linnea.
- Published
- 10 Apr 2025
Original amount 600,000 CHF, converted at the ECB reference rate of 10 Apr 2025.
- WEKO-Medienmitteilung vom 10.04.2025: WEKO sanktioniert Abrede über pharmazeutischen Wirkstoff Press release of an authority
- Newsroom-Schnittstelle der Bundesverwaltung: Volltext der WEKO-Medienmitteilung vom 10.04.2025 (onsb_de_105610) Press release of an authority
Checked against the official source on 2 Oct 2026 · Direct link
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23 Sep 2024 a French publishing groupWEKO orders a French publishing group to grant a Swiss bookseller domestic terms (under appeal) Order
A French publishing group charged a Swiss bookseller considerably higher purchase prices for direct supply in France than are customary there, although the bookseller had no reasonable alternatives. The Swiss Competition Commission (WEKO) found an abuse of relative market power and ordered the publishing group to grant the bookseller the sales and discount terms applicable in France for direct purchases, less admissible additional costs for the Swiss market; the publishing group bears the procedural costs of CHF 254,865. According to WEKO (as of March 2025), an appeal against the decision was pending before the Federal Administrative Court.
Since relative market power was introduced, foreign suppliers can also be required to grant dependent Swiss buyers their domestic terms.
Relative market power and refusal to supply on foreign terms
- Authority / court
- Wettbewerbskommission (WEKO)
- Area of law
- Competition law · Abuse of market power
- Legal basis
- Art. 7 Abs. 1 und 2 lit. g KG (relative Marktmacht), Art. 30 Abs. 1 KG
- Action
- Order
- Status of proceedings
- under appeal
- Sector
- Media and online platforms
- Published
- 21 Nov 2024
- WEKO, Entscheide (Übersicht) (Entscheidung 2024) Decision of an authority
Checked against the official source on 2 Oct 2026 · Company name anonymised since 23 Sep 2026 · Direct link
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10 Jun 2024 a Valais transport and waste disposal company and four other companiesWEKO: sanction against Valais transport and waste disposal firm over bid rigging €98,722
Companies engaged in the collection, transport and disposal of waste in Valais colluded on bids. WEKO imposed a sanction of CHF 95,138 on the transport and waste disposal company (another company: CHF 0), approved amicable settlements and apportioned the procedural costs among four companies.
Municipal waste disposal contracts are a focus of competition authorities – contacts about bids among competitors are off-limits, including among SMEs.
Collusion in municipal waste disposal tenders
- Authority / court
- Wettbewerbskommission (WEKO)
- Area of law
- Competition law · Cartels and collusion
- Legal basis
- Art. 5 Abs. 3 i.V.m. Abs. 1 KG, Art. 49a Abs. 1 KG
- Action
- Fine
- Status of proceedings
- unknown
- Sector
- Transport, logistics and shipping
- Mitigating circumstances
- Amicable settlements; leniency programme (another company free of sanctions)
Original amount 95,138 CHF, converted at the ECB reference rate of 10 Jun 2024.
- WEKO, Entscheide (Übersicht) (Entscheidung 2024) Decision of an authority
Checked against the official source on 28 Sep 2026 · Version 4 · Company name anonymised since 10 Jun 2026 · Direct link
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21 May 2024 fourteen Swiss gravel and construction companiesWEKO fines a gravel pit and its shareholders CHF 5.3 million €5.37m
A gravel extraction joint venture, the largest gravel and landfill pit in its region, and its shareholders coordinated through the joint venture's board, granted the shareholders cheaper gravel prices and transport subsidies, undertook not to extract gravel themselves in the joint venture's area and for a time tied the dumping of excavated material to gravel purchases. The Wettbewerbskommission (WEKO, Swiss Competition Commission) imposed sanctions totalling CHF 5,303,750: CHF 3,131,100 on the joint venture, CHF 383,150 on a first shareholder group of three companies, CHF 304,150 on a second group of three companies, CHF 460,750 on a third group of two companies, CHF 242,500 on a gravel works, CHF 387,100 on a fourth group of two companies and CHF 395,000 on a fifth group of two companies, together with conduct requirements concerning the joint venture's board and management. With the exception of individual points, the ruling is under appeal before the Federal Administrative Court (as of December 2025).
Where competitors sit together on the board of a joint venture, clear information barriers are needed, or the board becomes a cartel platform.
Joint ventures between competitors: information exchange and collusion on the board
- Authority / court
- Wettbewerbskommission (WEKO)
- Area of law
- Competition law · Cartels and collusion
- Legal basis
- Art. 49a Abs. 1 i.V.m. Art. 5 Abs. 1, 3 und 4 KG; bei KAGA zusätzlich Art. 7 Abs. 1 i.V.m. Abs. 2 KG
- Action
- Fine
- Status of proceedings
- under appeal
- Sector
- Construction and real estate
- Mitigating circumstances
- Several parties concluded amicable settlements with the WEKO secretariat, which WEKO approved.
- Published
- 27 Aug 2024
Original amount 5,303,750 CHF, converted at the ECB reference rate of 21 May 2024.
- WEKO, Entscheide (Übersicht) (Entscheidung 2024) Decision of an authority
Checked against the official source on 2 Oct 2026 · Company name anonymised since 21 May 2026 · Direct link
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15 Jan 2024 a dominant Swiss delivery company and a private mail delivery companyWEKO prohibits the market leader's takeover of a private mail delivery company Order
The Wettbewerbskommission (WEKO, Swiss Competition Commission) prohibited a dominant Swiss delivery company from acquiring a private mail delivery company because the concentration would have eliminated effective competition for national addressed bulk letters over 50 grams for business customers and created or strengthened the acquirer's dominant position in further letter, parcel and newspaper delivery markets. WEKO rejected the claimed rescue takeover because another prospective buyer offered a more competitive solution; the procedural costs of CHF 98,000 are borne equally by both parties.
A buyer invoking the rescue of an ailing competitor must show that no more competition-friendly purchaser is available.
- Authority / court
- Wettbewerbskommission (WEKO)
- Area of law
- Competition law · Merger control
- Legal basis
- Art. 10 Abs. 2 KG i.V.m. Art. 32 und 33 KG (Zusammenschlusskontrolle)
- Action
- Order
- Status of proceedings
- unknown
- Sector
- Transport, logistics and shipping
- Published
- 19 Jan 2024
- WEKO, Entscheide (Übersicht) (Entscheidung 2024) Decision of an authority
Checked against the official source on 2 Oct 2026 · Company name anonymised since 15 Jan 2026 · Direct link
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4 Dec 2023 a large Swiss telecommunications groupWEKO: CHF 18.4 million against telecoms group over fibre network roll-out strategy €19.4m
The group expanded its fibre-optic network in such a way that competitors were not given Layer 1 access from the local exchanges. WEKO considered this to be an abuse of a dominant position, imposed a sanction of CHF 18,362,014, required the group to retrofit the network and imposed procedural costs of CHF 927,307.
Dominant network operators must assess infrastructure decisions for their consequences for competitors' access.
- Authority / court
- Wettbewerbskommission (WEKO)
- Area of law
- Competition law · Abuse of market power
- Legal basis
- Art. 7 Abs. 1 i.V.m. Abs. 2 lit. a und e KG, Art. 49a Abs. 1 KG
- Action
- Fine
- Status of proceedings
- under appeal
- Sector
- Telecoms, IT and software
- Employees
- 10,000 or more
Original amount 18,362,014 CHF, converted at the ECB reference rate of 4 Dec 2023.
- WEKO, Entscheide (Übersicht) (Entscheidung 2023) Decision of an authority
Checked against the official source on 28 Sep 2026 · Version 4 · Company name anonymised since 4 Dec 2025 · Direct link
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3 Jul 2023 a Swiss landfill operatorWEKO sanctions landfill operator for abuse of a dominant position Fine
According to WEKO's findings, the operator of a landfill in the canton of Basel-Landschaft abused its dominant position (Art. 7 para. 2 lit. b KG (Swiss Cartel Act), discrimination against trading partners). The sanction is between CHF 762,048 and 1,143,072 (exact amount redacted in the published version); in addition, there are procedural costs of CHF 196,530.
Regional infrastructure such as landfills can also be dominant – prices and acceptance conditions must be non-discriminatory.
- Authority / court
- Wettbewerbskommission (WEKO)
- Area of law
- Competition law · Abuse of market power
- Legal basis
- Art. 7 Abs. 1 und Abs. 2 lit. b KG, Art. 49a Abs. 1 KG
- Action
- Fine
- Status of proceedings
- unknown
- Sector
- Construction and real estate
- WEKO, Entscheide (Übersicht) (Entscheidung 2023) Decision of an authority
Checked against the official source on 28 Sep 2026 · Version 4 · Company name anonymised since 3 Jul 2025 · Direct link